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CHAPTER 1
Analytical frameworks for global 
value chains: An overview
SATOSHI INOMATA
In a keynote speech at a seminar on global value chains (GVCs), Richard Baldwin delivered wittily, with his mischie-vous smile, a rather provocative statement: “The term ‘global value chains’ doesn’t describe what we see today in the world 
economy”1 because:
• The world economy is not global; it remains regionally seg-
regated, such as Factory Asia, Factory Europe, and Factory 
North America.
• What matters is not value (added) but jobs, especially good 
jobs.
• Production systems are not configured as a linear sequence of 
production stages like chains but consist of complex networks 
of hubs and spokes.
This is alarming. However, it is also true that many people now 
use the term “GVCs” —often inconsistently across contexts.
With that as the backdrop, this chapter cultivates some 
common ground for approaching this new area of academic inter-
est by tracing the development of relevant studies. This is not an 
encyclopedic literature survey; it focuses only on the strands of 
research that explicitly consider vertical (supply–use) relations of 
cross-border production sharing and their impact on distributing 
value among the parties — which is at the heart of GVC studies.2
The first section of the chapter considers why GVC studies are 
important from the viewpoint of their contribution to the history 
of international trade theories. The second traces the develop-
ment of the GVC concept, with some reference to the evolution 
of global production networks. The third introduces the main 
theoretical achievement in GVC studies. The fourth summarizes 
the challenges for a quantitative description of GVCs, particularly 
for the innovative use of multicountry input- output tables. The 
fifth addresses pressing issues for advancing GVC research. The 
last section presents some meta- methodological considerations 
on the development of GVC analyses.3
The global value chain paradigm: New-New-
New Trade Theory?
Since David Ricardo established the foundation of international 
trade theory two centuries ago, mainstream thought, from 
Heckscher-Ohlin to Samuelson, has hinged on three classic 
premises (figure 1.1):
• Markets are perfectly competitive, and producers operate at 
constant returns to scale.
• An industry consists of homogeneous producers.
• Countries trade only final products — traditionally phrased as 
Portuguese wine for English cloth — and each product is made 
using the production factors of only the exporting country.
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The first premise was shaken in the 1970s and 1980s when 
a new school of thought, New Trade Theory, emerged. Its key 
feature, pioneered by Krugman (1979, 1980) and generalized by 
Helpman and Krugman (1985), was the theoretical scope for con-
sidering production technology with increasing returns to scale 
(paired with the love of variety), which underpins the analytical 
frameworks of international trade under imperfect competition. 
The models provided a plausible explanation for the prevalence 
of intra-industrial trade between countries with similar technol-
ogy and resource endowments — a phenomenon that cannot be 
explained by the orthodox notion of comparative advantage.4
The evolution of theoretical frameworks is generally driven 
by the need to fill a gap between a newly discovered stylized 
fact and the predictions of prevailing models. Just as the empir-
ical findings on intra-industry trade, notably those of Grubel and 
Lloyd (1975), were followed by New Trade Theory, so too was the 
second classic premise of homogeneous producers reconsidered 
following evidence in the late 1990s. Bernard and Jensen’s (1995, 
1999) detailed examination of firm-level microdata revealed sub-
stantial heterogeneity in firm productivity between exporters 
and nonexporters in a given industry. Melitz (2003) pioneered 
an explanation for these observations, advancing in the quest 
for what was later called New-New Trade Theory. By assuming a 
fixed cost of entering export activities, the model considers the 
mechanism of a firm’s endogenous selection on market entry or 
exit and thereby provides a powerful explanation for the coexis-
tence of heterogeneous firms within an industry.5
A third wave of reconstructing classical theory is now under way, 
and the literature on GVCs is generally linked to this development 
strand. With the dramatic advance of transportation modes and 
information and communication technology, production processes 
can now be “sliced” into several production segments, each corre-
sponding to a particular task — such as design, parts procurement, 
assembly, and distribution. These segments are relocated, often 
across national borders, to the places where the tasks can be per-
formed most efficiently. Thus the core subject of the literature today 
is not only the movement of final products, as classical theories have 
focused on (under the third premise), but also the cross-national 
transfer of tasks, or the value added generated by these tasks.
The main characteristic of the GVC paradigm is the vari-
ety of its intellectual origins. The initial theory of production 
fragmentation (Jones and Kierzkowski 1990) was followed by 
FIGURE 1.1 Genealogical map of analytical frameworks for global value chains
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increasing observations of trade in intermediate goods (Feens-
tra and Hanson 1996b; Campa and Goldberg 1997; Yeats 1998), 
which brought about further elaboration of key concepts such 
as unbundling (Baldwin 2006) and trade in tasks (Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg 2008a).
In parallel, methodological frameworks also advanced in 
sociology. Drawing on analytical scopes of academic fields, from 
business management to industrial organization theory, a com-
prehensive study on the structure and mechanism of value dis-
tribution among countries led to the term “global value chains” 
(Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005).
The empirical aspect of GVC studies is newer. Earlier value-
added analyses based on firms’ business records (Dedrick, Krae-
mer, and Linden 2008; Xing and Detert 2010) are now comple-
mented by input- output analysis, in which various GVC metrics 
were devised using multicountry input- output databases, such 
as trade in value added (Johnson and Noguera 2012) and supply 
chain length (Dietzenbacher, Romero, and Bosma 2005; Fally 2011).
One of the key integrating forces was Antràs and Helpman 
(2004), who featured the legacies of both the New Trade Theory 
(increasing returns to scale) and the New-New Trade Theory (firm 
heterogeneity) in a study based on the frameworks of contract 
theory, while contract theory can be associated with sociolo-
gists’ approaches to GVCs. The properties of the model were 
carried over to Antràs and Chor (2013), who further incorporated 
the methodological progress in input- output economics.
The interdisciplinary characteristic of the GVC paradigm 
allows for large-scale research collaboration across the social sci-
ences, as demonstrated in this report. Topics in the GVC litera-
ture, some of which are highly politically relevant, include:6
• Industrialization strategy (full-set versus GVC-driven industri-
alization).
• Labor issues (impact of globalization on employment and 
income distribution).
• Regional development (trickle-down effect through domestic 
production linkages).
• Innovation and technological spillovers (learning through 
GVC participation).
• Economic crisis (propagation of external shocks on produc-
tion and trade).
• Supply chain resilience (impact of natural or human-caused 
disasters on supply chains).
• Environmental protection (carbon footprints and global 
governance).
• Consumer protection (food safety and certification).
• Poverty alleviation (fair trade and corporate social responsibility).
• Trade regimes (World Trade Organization and regional trade 
agreements).
• National accounts (statistical bias of gross trade data).
Concept development
The concept of GVCs did not follow a linear development path. 
The basic images of the term were conceived and fostered in 
various scientific subfields in different ways at different times. 
The ideas only recently started to cross over academic borders, 
and they continue to evolve along dynamic interactions of theo-
ries and empirics.
Unbundling economies: Baldwin’s historical perspective
When the movement of goods, people, and ideas was not as 
frictionless as it is today, economic activities were organized 
mostly within the boundaries of a small-scale community (figure 
1.2).7 Farmers harvested wheat and milled flour for a bakery a 
few blocks away, and the baker baked loaves of bread for the 
neighbors who walked into the shop every morning. Economic 
self-sufficiency was achieved with the points of production and 
consumption in close proximity. Extraterritorial business was 
rare, except perhaps for the merchant voyages of a sailing ship or 
the Silk Road caravans. And those cross-border trades dealt only 
with a handful of luxury items such as spices and silk products, 
sold at high prices to compensate for the risk incurred and the 
time spent during the journey.
International trade began to develop at the beginning of the 
19th century when steam engines rapidly improved land trans-
port (by locomotives) and water transport (by steamships), trig-
gering unprecedented expansion of trade activities beyond local 
communities. The economies of scale from mass logistics further 
lowered transportation costs. The point of consumption was 
unbundled from the point of production, and goods travelled all 
over the world in search of the most profitable markets.
Paradoxically, the geographical unbundling of economies 
between production and consumption coincided with the 
agglomeration of production activities in large-scale factories 
in industrial zones. Because of the increase in potential custom-
ers created by international trade, the mass production system 
became an appropriate manufacturing mode at the time. The 
key to high productivity in manufacturing is the division of labor, 
as seen in Adam Smith’s classic example of pin-making,8 where 
workers specialize in a particular task to raise their competencies 
through intensive learning of a specific routine. However, division 
of labor entails delicate coordination among the different stages 
because the variety of tasks must collectively produce a homo-
geneous product. Accordingly, the different productive func-
tions were brought together under the same roof (a factory) to 
facilitate communication and create harmony among the various 
tasks.
The information technology revolution in the 1980s completely 
changed this picture. With telexes, facsimiles, and the Internet — 
along with high-speed international communication networks — it 
became cheaper and easier to coordinate production units in 
different locations. Sales forecasts and procurement schedules 
could be instantly delivered to production lines, and the elec-
tronic profiles of minute product designs and specifications could 
be shared with and adjusted by every production site. Productive 
functions no longer had to be confined within proximate spaces. 
The technological unbundling of production activities has accel-
erated, with some segments relocated across borders to exploit 
the cost differentials of production factors in various countries.
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Vertical integration
Richard Baldwin’s unbundling concept captures one important 
aspect of the dynamics of the world economy. But there is 
another critical dimension of the analytical perspective for the 
development of GVCs.
In the beginning of the 20th century Henry Ford devised and 
implemented a business model that aimed to integrate various 
segments (functions) of a production process under a single 
capital and management umbrella through the acquisition of a 
variety of companies. The model, later known as a vertical inte-
gration strategy, became a modus operandi in the era of mass 
production.9
Early studies of vertical integration focused on market imper-
fections. A firm integrates other entities to redress pre- existing 
market power distortions, such as double marginalization, 
free-riding, or entry foreclosure (Tirole 1989).
Another strand of thought considers the preclusion of trans-
action costs as a main motive for vertical integration, where inter-
nalizing production activities is a measure to avoid the potential 
costs of establishing formal business relations at arm’s length.
Given these benefits of integration, why then do some firms 
not choose to integrate? Because the internal arrangement of 
activities involves nontrivial administrative and bureaucratic 
costs. Accordingly, the governance schemes are chosen to 
minimize the production inefficiencies attributed to a trading 
relationship by weighing the transaction costs of spot-market 
dealings against the bureaucratic costs of unified hierarchical 
organizations (firms).10
From the viewpoint of transaction cost economics the costs of 
concern include not only the direct costs of writing, monitoring, 
and enforcing contracts, but also the ex post performance inef-
ficiencies caused by contractual hazards within the relationship. 
One of the basic tenets of transaction cost economics is that con-
tracts are incomplete — in that the terms of exchange between 
the parties cannot be disciplined ex ante because of information 
asymmetry.11 When the parties are locked in to the transaction, 
the incompleteness of contracts evokes contractual hazards of 
various types, yet vertical integration pre-empts these hazards 
by internalizing ex post quasi-rents into the unified objective 
function of the integrated firm. So vertical integration becomes 
a preferred mode of organizing value chains when the benefit of 
attenuating the opportunistic behavior of parties within the rela-
tionship outweighs the cost of inefficiently allocating resources 
associated with bureaucratic arrangements (Joskow 2003).
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And today vertical integration in the multicountry dimen-
sion refers to the emergence of business entities called multi-
national corporations. Foreign direct investment by multinational 
corporations is the main driver of global production networks, 
decisively influencing the distribution of value added across 
countries.12
Accordingly, there are four modes of organizing value chains, 
along the axes of whether the task is done in-house or out-
sourced and of whether it is carried out domestically or across 
national borders (figure 1.3).
Value chains and global value chains
The term “value chains” was conceived in business management 
studies. Porter (1985) tailored the concept as a basic framework 
for developing a corporate strategy to promote firm competi-
tiveness by directing attention to the entire system of activities 
involved in producing and consuming a product. A corporate 
entity is first decomposed into a set of business activities with 
individual functions that constitute analytical units for diagnos-
ing the firm’s competitive advantage. When a firm has a relatively 
atomized organizational structure, the task of each unit (business 
activity) — such as product design, materials procurement, mar-
keting, and distribution — tends to be defined in a way to pursue 
the individual objective of that particular unit, which may or 
may not conflict with the objective of other units. However, in 
the value chain perspective all activities should be collectively 
organized to ensure the optimal functioning of the corporate 
entity as a whole. To this end, the nature of linkages between 
activities (value chains) is carefully examined — just as if drawing 
an anatomical chart of a firm — to internalize potential externali-
ties through cross-functional coordination, which is an important 
source of the firm’s competitive advantage.13
In contrast, GVC studies originated in sociology. Unlike Por-
ter’s value chain concept, which is concerned primarily with how 
firm strategies can be renovated by shifting the focus to the con-
figuration of business activities, GVC studies consider the gener-
ation and transfer of value within the system as a consequence 
of firm efforts to optimize production networks and, conversely, 
the mechanism of how the value distribution structure affects the 
firm’s choice of the organizational form of international produc-
tion networks. GVC analysis is not a global extension of Porter’s 
value chain approach because the scope and motivation differ, 
as described below.14
Typology of global value chains
The main objective of GVC studies is to explore the interplay 
between value distribution mechanisms and organization of the 
cross-border production–consumption nexus. The concept was 
first collectively framed in the discussions of the Global Value 
Chains Initiative (2000–05), sponsored by the Rockefeller Founda-
tion,15 and further crystallized by Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 
(2005), whose analytical focus rests on the governance structure of 
organizing international production networks. Who are the players 
in the game? What kinds of rules exist? Is it a competitive or a 
cooperative play? What generates the winning opportunities? In 
answering these questions, GVC studies pay attention to the forms 
of transactions, codified or otherwise, between stakeholders. This 
is because the way transactions are made reflects the structure of 
power relations between the parties, which ultimately determines 
the scope and magnitude of value distributions within the game.
The vertical integration type of GVC is based on the hierarchi-
cal structure that assumes an absolute and unidirectional control 
of the parent company over its subsidiaries. The activities and 
performance of subsidiaries are strictly monitored and assessed 
in line with their headquarter management strategies. In con-
trast, outsourcing options tend to generate leveled relationships 
between clients (buyers) and subcontractors (service suppliers), 
and the power exercise is more or less mutual, unlike the vertical 
integration type.
Within this dichotomy, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 
(2005) set out a GVC typology in a higher resolution spectrum 
in accord with power relations between the contracting parties. 
Figure 1.4 illustrates five variants of GVC governance. The rect-
angles represent the firm’s boundary, and their size indicates the 
strength of bargaining power in relation to the other party. The 
arrows show the direction and extent of business intervention in 
the partners’ activities, which can be supportive, such as to draw 
“win-win” scenarios in the long-term perspective, or predatory, 
by focusing on uptakes of quick profits in the short run. Toward 
the right of the diagram, the clients (the headquarters in the case 
of the “hierarchy” type) possess greater bargaining powers and 
so are considered to exert a strong influence over the distribu-
tion of value added. (See annex 1.1 for a detailed description.)
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) also considered the 
dynamics of the GVC configuration by factoring out three param-
eters: complexity of transactions, ability to codify transactions, 
and capabilities in the supply base (known as the “3 C’s model”–
Complexity, Codifiability, and Capabilities). For example, the 
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shift in the type of value chains from market to relational is asso-
ciated with an increase in the complexity of transactions. The 
shift from relational to modular assumes an increase in the abil-
ity to codify transactions. And the improving capabilities in the 
supply base, other things equal, drive value chains from the cap-
tive type toward the market type. And so on.16
By probing the mechanism of GVC configurations, the model 
helps identify the policy instruments to facilitate the transfor-
mation of value chains from one type to another, especially in 
the light of industrial upgrading and the GVC-driven growth of 
developing countries.17
Economic modeling
In principle, economists’ analytical focus on GVCs has been on 
three issues: the mechanism of the fragmentation of production 
processes,18 the impacts of offshoring on domestic factor incomes 
and welfare, and the firm’s choice of an organizational form of GVCs.
Mechanism of the fragmentation of production processes
Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) provide a model of outsourcing and 
set out the factors that affect the degree and form of the fragmen-
tation of production activities. Figure 1.5a illustrates the relation 
between output level (market size) and total cost of production for 
a firm whose production technology contains elements of increas-
ing returns to scale. The line Fd1 represents the cost schedule of 
the traditional method, with all production stages concentrated in 
one location. When a part of the production process is outsourced 
to a domestic partner, two things occur, as shown in the move-
ment of the cost curve from Fd1 to Fd2. First, the curve becomes 
flatter, indicating an improvement in productivity caused by the 
division of labor. Second, the curve shifts upward, indicating an 
increase in fixed costs (from c1 to c2) because of the need for coor-
dination between the production units in different locations.19 
Here, the least costly form of production will switch from the tradi-
tional method to outsourcing at the output level q1.
When outsourcing options are enlarged to include the inter-
national context, two other aspects are also taken into account.
• Production factor costs are considered to be more diverse 
between countries than within a country, so productivity will 
rise more when outsourcing takes place across borders in 
accord with comparative advantage.
• Connecting production units in different countries is more 
costly than connecting production units within the same 
country. International logistics is generally more expensive, 
marked up by import duties and costs for clearing customs 
and the like. There also are nontrivial communication costs for 
coordinating production units in countries with different lan-
guages, legal systems, and business ethics.
FIGURE 1.4 Typology of global value chains
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These features are represented by line Fw1, which has a flat-
ter slope for increased productivity and a higher intercept for 
an extra top-up of the fixed cost (from c2 to c3). Then, the opti-
mal form of production will switch from domestic outsourcing to 
cross-border outsourcing (offshoring) at the output level q2.
In this light, it is possible to consider where multiple countries 
are involved in the production process (Fw2, Fw3, …). Different 
schedules can be drawn for various outsourcing options, as in 
figure 1.5b, and the shaded boundary defines the optimal form 
of production arrangement at each level of output.
The model’s implications for a global production arrange-
ment are threefold. Other things being equal, the production 
process will be more prone to international fragmentation when:
• The targeted market is larger, so that it has more room to 
absorb the increased supply of goods from the organization 
of more efficient divisions of labor across borders.
• The costs of connecting the production activities in different 
countries are less inhibitive.
• The countries in the production networks are more diverse in 
their factor costs, so there is a better chance for offshoring 
firms to exploit comparative advantage.
Impacts of offshoring on domestic factor incomes and 
welfare
The offshoring model was further developed to address income 
distribution and welfare — a natural response to mounting politi-
cal concerns about the potentially detrimental effect of offshor-
ing on the domestic labor market (the industrial hollowing- out 
problem).20
Traditionally, the effect of international trade on the labor 
market has been considered in regard to a resource shift 
between industrial sectors caused by import competition, with-
out much attention to the change in the within-sector compo-
sition of different types of labor. Newer globalization literature 
seizes on this point, recognizing that offshoring is a cross-border 
movement of a production activity corresponding to a task for a 
particular type and skill of labor.21
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b) considered the impact 
of offshoring that follows the liberalization of foreign ownership 
in developing countries. Substantial movements of capital from 
developed countries to developing countries are accompanied 
by transfers of some segments of production processes that are 
considered more skill-intensive by the standard of developing 
countries but less skill-intensive by the standard for developed 
countries. Accordingly, the demand for labor becomes skewed 
toward higher skilled labor in the light of the respective skill stan-
dard of each economy, so the relative wages of low-skilled labor 
fall in both developed and developing countries.22
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) then introduced a 
“trade in tasks” concept to explain how an increase in offshoring 
feasibility affects the productivity and factor incomes of the off-
shoring country. They emphasized the need to shift the analytical 
focus from goods, as in the conventional trade theory (Portu-
guese wine for English cloth), to tasks that line up in a production 
process, in order to capture the rising prevalence of offshoring 
activities in a firm’s business strategies.
In the model the offshoring feasibility is parameterized as an 
improvement in the coordination capability between the firm’s 
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headquarters and its foreign suppliers through transportation 
and communication technologies. The sensitivity to the change 
in offshoring feasibility is assumed to vary across different types 
of tasks. Some tasks (such as those akin to codified description) 
are easy to offshore, while others (such as those relying on per-
sonal tacit knowledge) are not.23
The impact of the improved prospect for offshoring is consid-
ered through three channels:
• A labor-supply effect. Moving some tasks to foreign coun-
tries frees up the domestic labor that would otherwise carry 
out these tasks, so it has an effect analogous to increasing 
the supply of labor in the market. Such an implication, widely 
discussed in the mass media and political circles, generally 
evokes opinions against a firm’s offshoring activities for fear of 
lowering the real wages of offshored labor or losing domestic 
jobs when wages are sticky.
• A relative-price effect. A country offshores low-skilled labor 
when its cross-country comparative advantage is weaker in 
that type of task than in the tasks of high-skilled labor. The 
country would then specialize in exporting goods that are 
intensive in high-skilled labor, as conventional trade theory 
predicts. Accordingly, if an increase in exports leads to a 
deterioration in the country’s terms of trade, it would create 
a negative impact on the welfare of its high-skilled labor 
through the Stolper–Samuelson mechanism. (However, this 
effect comes into play only when the country is large enough 
to affect the international relative prices of goods.)
• A productivity effect. This effect is a unique feature of the 
model that is not fully considered in other studies on the 
topic. When the prospect for offshoring improves — say, by an 
increase in communication capabilities — an offshoring firm’s 
profitability will rise in proportion to the extent that the firm 
relies on the offshoring business. Such a productivity effect is 
equivalent to the consequence of factor-augmenting techno-
logical progress, so it is able to bring a positive impact on the 
employment of domestic workers (across all industries) whose 
task levels are similar to those of offshored labor.
The net impact of offshoring on factor incomes is the sum of 
these three effects. And in most cases the empirical consider-
ation is reduced to whether the productivity effect will dominate 
the other two effects — if so, the argument turns in favor of off-
shoring activities.24
Firm’s choice of an organizational form of global value 
chains
The factors that determine whether a transaction is mediated 
through markets or within firm boundaries have long been a sub-
ject of inquiry in industrial organizational theory. The question 
has been addressed in many ways since Ronald Coase docu-
mented his insights on the nature of the firm,25 and it has been 
brought into the international context in studies on intrafirm 
trade and multinational corporations.
Antràs (2003), one of the earliest efforts in pursuing this 
direction, synthesized firm theory under incomplete contracts 
(Grossman and Hart 1986) and international trade theory under 
imperfect competition (Helpman and Krugman 1985) to explain 
the asymmetric prevalence of intrafirm trade in capital-inten-
sive industries and between capital-abundant countries. The 
firm’s dual motives for minimizing transaction costs (by assign-
ing property rights) and factor costs (by exploiting comparative 
advantages) are analyzed in the unified theoretical framework. 
The model expands the margins of analytical scope in figure 1.3 
to cover the range of value chain variations for both spatial and 
organizational dimensions.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) introduced another dimension to 
the analysis: firm heterogeneity. Drawing on Melitz (2003), Antràs 
and Helpman investigated the impact of within-sector hetero-
geneity in firm productivity on the firm’s globalization decision. 
The model predicts that different degrees of entry cost to global 
activities bring about the productivity ranking among firms on 
the choice of globalization modes. The most productive firms 
would choose to undertake foreign direct investment, the next 
most productive firms would choose to engage in arm’s length 
offshoring, and so on down to the least productive firms, which 
would choose to engage only in domestic procurement.
Further to these approaches, Antràs and Chor (2013) shed new 
light on the line of analyses by considering a technological order-
ing of production stages — a crucial attribute of value chains — to 
address the traditional make-or-buy question for each segment 
of a production process along a value chain. Incompleteness of 
contract, as previously defined, entails strategic consideration by 
a lead firm (final good producer) in choosing the form of value 
chain governance. And the key prediction of the model is that 
the lead firm should differentiate the governance forms between 
upstream and downstream suppliers for optimizing the gains 
from the set of transactions.
The model identifies two types of value chains, determined 
by the nature of the final product: sequential complements and 
sequential substitutes. The type of sequentiality that character-
izes the production process affects the lead firm’s decision on 
the governance arrangements along that value chain (figure 1.6). 
For sequential complements the lead firm chooses to integrate 
downstream suppliers while outsourcing its upstream produc-
tion stages. For sequential substitutes upstream suppliers are 
vertically integrated, while the transactions with downstream 
suppliers are carried out at arm’s length. (See annex 1.2 for a 
brief description of the argument.)26
The property-rights theory on the firm’s choice of an organi-
zational form is highly resonant with the sociologists’ analytical 
insights about value chain governance because, broadly speak-
ing, both approaches engage the contractibility of transactions 
as a core parameter of the models. The topic is thus one of the 
most promising areas for extensive interdisciplinary dialogue on 
synergetic development of the GVC analysis.
Empirical challenges
The rapid progress of empirical analysis on GVCs has been backed 
up by two substantial changes in the research environment. One 
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is the increasing availability of relevant data and statistics, espe-
cially multicountry input-output tables and firm- level micro data. 
The other is the advance in data- processing capacity of per-
sonal computers for handling these massive datasets as well as 
the information and communications infrastructure that allows 
for efficient shared use of the databases. What was impossible 
20 years ago is common practice today, and the empirical chal-
lenges of GVC analysis are entering a new phase of development.
Mapping global value chains by firm business records
The initial efforts to quantitatively describe GVCs can be found 
in studies that use firm-specific business records. These studies 
typically aim to identify the composition of inputs procurement 
or the sales networks of a product on the basis of data provided 
by the manufacturers themselves or from the teardown reports 
of private consulting companies — or, for the average breakdown 
of an industry’s generic product type, the information from the 
relevant industry associations (Sturgeon and others 2013).
Earlier studies of this kind include Dedrick, Kraemer, and 
Linden (2008), who analyzed the value-added structure of four 
representative products — Apple’s iPod and video iPod and Hew-
lett Packard’s and Lenovo’s laptop personal computers — using 
information from business reports.27 They found that a video 
iPod with a retail price of $299 in 2005 was associated with a 
breakdown of $144 for the product’s factory cost, $75 for dis-
tribution margins and $80 for the profit of the lead firm (Apple), 
while within the factory cost only $3.86 was estimated for the 
assembly services in China. The original motivation of the study 
was to investigate how firms benefit from technological innova-
tion through production sharing, but it came to elucidate a sepa-
rate and even more alarming question about the validity of con-
ventional trade statistics based on gross values.
In this context, Xing and Detert (2010) addressed U.S.–China 
trade imbalances. iPhones were not sold in China in 2009, which 
implies that China’s exports of iPhones to the United States were 
equivalent to the U.S. trade deficit of the product in relation to 
China. The study shows that the U.S. deficit of $1.9 billion for 
iPhone trades is reduced to $73 million if viewed in value- added 
terms and broken down to include the deficits with other countries 
such as Japan and Germany, which are the core parts suppliers.
These product-level approaches are useful in drawing the 
actual structure of production chains because they directly use 
data provided by individual firms rather than resorting to statisti-
cal inference. But the weakness is apparent in the flipside.28
First, these approaches have limited applicability when con-
sidering macroeconomic issues such as trade policies, because 
the analytical focus is cast only on a particular product or on the 
activity of a few firms. This is far from sufficient to capture the 
entire value flows in the national context.
Second, as Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2008) pointed 
out, most firm data do not explicitly present compensation of 
employees, an important component of value-added items in 
the national accounting framework, but merge it with other types 
of production costs.
Third, because values are generated at every point of the 
production process, the value-added analysis should be able 
to trace all the production stages along the entire supply chain. 
However, the product-level approach considers only the value-
added structure of direct input suppliers (the first tier), leaving 
the rest of the value-added stream untracked. For example, a 
hard-disk drive in an iPhone contains subparts produced in dif-
ferent countries and thereby requires further decomposition of 
the value-added sources.
Mapping global value chains by input- output tables
Given the limitations of the conventional approach, multicountry 
input- output tables have received increased attention. A multi-
country input- output table provides a comprehensive map of 
international transactions of goods and services in a massive 
dataset that combines the national input- output tables of vari-
ous countries at a given point of time. Because the tables con-
tain information on supply–use relations between industries 
and across countries — which are totally absent from foreign 
trade statistics — it is possible to identify the vertical structure of 
international production sharing. And unlike the product-level 
approach, input- output analysis covers an entire set of industries 
that make up an economic system, thus enabling the measure-
ment of cross-border value flows for a country or region. Theo-
retically, such analysis has the capacity to track the value-added 
generation process of every product in every country at every 
production stage.
The input- output approach has weaknesses as well. Sturgeon 
and others (2013) pointed out the limitations of (multicountry) 
input- output analyses arising from the statistical characteris-
tics of input- output tables. First, the table’s sectoral classifica-
tion is based on industrial categories so that the value-added 
of a specific task such as product design or assembly cannot 
be identified. Second, transactions are recorded on a domestic 
basis, so production activities are circumscribed by territorial 
borders rather than by the nationality that the produced goods 
FIGURE 1.6 Sequential choices for organizing value chains
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are associated with, which may cause (analytically) inappropriate 
attribution of value added among countries.29 Third, information 
on the nature of specific transactions is totally absent from input- 
output statistics, making qualitative analyses of value chains dif-
ficult, if not impossible.
In a nutshell the product-level approach is relevant for ana-
lyzing qualitative aspects of individual value chains, such as the 
form of governance arrangement or the mode of technological 
transfer between parties, while the multicountry input- output 
approach captures a general picture of value chain configuration 
in the larger context from a systematic point of view. They are 
not exclusive substitutes but must be employed in a complemen-
tary manner, depending on the type of research questions.
GVC studies using input- output tables have become increas-
ingly common in the last decade. Their origin can be traced back 
to Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), who introduced the concept of 
vertical specialization — defined as the amount of imported inter-
mediate inputs used to produce an exported good or, put dif-
ferently, the import content of exports, which is presented as a 
measure of international production sharing.
Chen and others (2004) first brought the idea into the value-
added context in relation to the statistical distortion caused by 
ignoring the presence of processing trade and by measuring 
international trade in terms of gross exports. Here the long-de-
bated issue of U.S.–China trade imbalances was fully consid-
ered in the value-added perspective. Koopman, Wang, and Wei 
(2012) further developed and methodologically formalized the 
approach for separating China’s national input- output matrices 
into two components, one for the export processing sectors and 
one for the rest of the economy.30 They showed that the foreign 
content of value added in China’s manufacturing exports was 
about 50% in 2002, more than double what would have been 
obtained by a straightforward application of the vertical special-
ization metric. It quantitatively demonstrates the importance of 
measuring trade in value added terms, as well as the significant 
analytical impact of overlooking processing trade.
While these empirical exercises rely on the national input- 
output tables of individual countries, Daudin, Rifflart, and Sch-
weisguth (2006) used the database of the Global Trade Analy-
sis Project to construct a multicountry input- output table of 70 
countries and their composite regions in order to calculate the 
domestic value-added content of exports, alongside indices of 
vertical specialization and regionalization. Johnson and Nogu-
era (2012) calculated the ratio of value-added exports to gross 
exports as a metric of international production sharing, again 
using the Global Trade Analysis Project database.31 They exten-
sively discussed the impact of production sharing on the scale 
of bilateral trade balances with respect to multiple countries, 
not to mention the U.S. trade deficit with China, which shows a 
30–40% drop in value added terms from the traditional calcula-
tion (figure 1.7).32
Bems and Johnson (2012) present an interesting extension 
of the trade in value added approach to international macro-
economics by proposing the concept of the value-added real 
effective exchange rate. Real effective exchange rates are com-
monly used to measure country export competitiveness by eval-
uating the magnitude of price adjustments necessary to clear 
the external imbalances or, put differently, the extent of nominal 
exchange rate misalignments.
Conventional real effective exchange rates are often calcu-
lated from a weighted basket of consumer price indices, where 
weights are based on bilateral gross trade flows. However, with 
FIGURE 1.7 Bilateral trade and value-added balances for the United States, by partner, 2004
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rapid globalization, conventional rates became an inappro-
priate measure in two respects. First, because real effective 
exchange rates are used to assess country export competitive-
ness in the world market, approximating price developments 
with consumer price indices is not ideal because consumer 
price indices summarize the prices of products whose value-
added origins could be fragmented across different countries. 
Second, using the same line of logic, the values of gross trade 
flows cannot serve as unbiased weights because they do not 
represent today’s economic reality of increasing production 
sharing among countries.
The value-added real effective exchange rate overcomes 
these problems by using gross domestic product (value-
added) deflators, instead of consumer price indices, to mea-
sure price changes, and bases its weights on value-added 
bilateral trade flows, instead of gross trade flows. Figure 1.8 
shows that the gap between China’s conventional and value-
added real effective exchange rates increased substantially 
from 2000 onward.33
One of the most recent achievements in this strand of analy-
ses is from Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014), who devised a full 
decomposition method of gross exports into various sources of 
value added. Gross exports are first decomposed into four cate-
gories: domestic value added absorbed abroad, domestic value 
added first exported then returned home, foreign value added, 
and pure double-counted terms; each category is then further 
decomposed by trading mode (figure 1.9). The result is a com-
plete picture of the value-added generation process, in which 
various preceding formulas for measuring value-added trade are 
systematically integrated into a single accounting framework. In 
particular, the method enables the isolation of double-counting 
elements in gross exports, which have long haunted trade econ-
omists conducting empirical analyses.
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For trade policies the channels of domestic value added first 
exported then returned home have important implications. For 
example, the antidumping measure that the European Commis-
sion imposed on the import of footwear from China and Viet Nam 
in 2006 is known to have had a detrimental impact on service 
industries in the European Union because these imported items 
contained considerable value added originating in the European 
design and distribution sectors. Such consequences could have 
been avoided by due reference to a detailed presentation of the 
value-added sources of traded products.34
Heterogeneity considered
Another important development in the quantitative analyses of 
GVCs, with a theoretical foundation in Melitz (2003), is account-
ing for within-sector heterogeneity in firm characteristics when 
constructing input- output tables. Conventional input- output 
tables do not differentiate the input structure of different types 
of producers in the same industry. However, export- oriented 
firms, especially those in the processing trade, generally have 
higher import intensity in sourcing intermediate inputs than do 
domestic- oriented producers. This implies that conventional 
input- output tables, which provide information only on the aver-
age input structure across all types of producers, may bias ana-
lytical results for countries where processing trade is prevalent 
(notably China and Mexico).
As stated earlier, Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2012) were first to 
formally address this problem, by presenting a method to split the 
Chinese input- output tables into subaccounts that align export 
processing activities with the rest of the sector. Tang, Wang, and 
Wang (2014) further elaborated the approach, by considering 
variation in such firm characteristics as size (large scale or small 
to medium scale) and ownership structure (domestic or foreign, 
private or state-owned). They also used the Chinese input- output 
tables but combined them with data from China’s industrial census 
and trade statistics by firm type. Importantly, the information on 
ownership structure allows the impact of China’s privatization pro-
gram on domestic value-chain upgrading to be assessed.
Ma, Wang, and Zhu (2015) integrated these approaches by 
considering firm heterogeneity in dual dimensions — trading 
mode (processing exporters or normal exporters plus nonexport-
ers) and firm characteristics (domestic-owned or foreign-owned). 
Using the information of ownership structure, they worked out 
the distribution of domestic value added according to factor 
ownership, which contributes to the conversion of measurement 
from gross domestic product to gross national income by taking 
into account firm heterogeneity.35
Heterogeneity can also be considered from a geographic per-
spective. The current setup of multicountry input- output tables 
regards a country as a point of transaction in global production 
networks. However, a national economy has a spatial dimension. 
Brazil and China cannot be treated the same way in the input- 
output matrices that Costa Rica and Singapore are. Inomata and 
Meng (2013) introduced the Transnational Inter regional Input- 
Output Table for China, Japan, and Korea, constructed by the 
Institute of Developing Economies, which links the interregional 
input- output tables of respective countries into a single matrix 
to account for regional heterogeneity within a country in a multi-
country input- output framework. The table allows for economic 
linkages across borders to be studied on a region-to-region 
basis — say, between Huanan in China and Kyushu in Japan.36
Domestic linkages between regions are particularly relevant 
when considering regional (within- country) development. For 
example, China built strong economic linkages with neighboring 
countries after the launch of the Reform and Open-Door Policy in 
1978, but the benefit of economic globalization was not equally 
shared within the country. Income disparities immediately wid-
ened between coastal and inland regions, and it took time for 
the positive impact from abroad to trickle down to inner China 
through domestic linkage effects. In this sense, regional aspects 
are crucial in accounting for the process of economic develop-
ment, especially for spacious and less integrated economies.37
Finally, consider heterogeneity in labor markets. The impact 
of GVCs on employment has been the subject of heated discus-
sion, especially around the industrial hollowing out problem. Ear-
lier globalization debates addressed the issue primarily in terms 
of the industrial structural change brought about by opening 
the domestic economy to global competition (leading to iden-
tification of declining, stagnant, and expanding industries). The 
current arguments from the GVC perspective engage in more 
microscopic analysis by looking into the wealth distribution at 
the task level within production chains, often epitomized by the 
so-called “smiley curve.”
Along these lines, Timmer and others (2014) conducted 
empirical research on value-added distribution among heteroge-
neous labor markets with different types of skill (upon recogniz-
ing that each task in the production processes can be associated 
with a particular level of labor skill). They employed the European 
Commission– funded World Input- Output Database augmented 
by the EU KLEMS database for information on factor inputs, in 
which three types of labor (low skilled, medium skilled, and high 
skilled) were identified on the basis of educational attainment. 
For most of the countries in the database the value-added share 
of high-skilled labor increased substantially from 1995 to 2008, 
while that of less-skilled labor declined. The results agree with 
the findings of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b) and have 
important implications for recent political events in Europe and 
the United States.38
Distance matters: “length” analyses of value chains
The theory of fragmentation predicts that if the production pro-
cess of a good has the potential for further segmentation by the 
change in production technologies or consumption markets, 
then there is an opportunity for a finer division of labor that will 
lead to better allocation of resources and lower marginal cost of 
production. This is especially true with access to international 
markets, because the differences in factor endowments (and thus 
comparative advantage) are even more salient across borders.39
Accordingly, the study on fragmentation concerns the number 
of production stages in a production process — comparing alter-
native technologies that produce the same good, one with few 
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production stages and another with many. Empirical research 
requires an overall perspective for the entire structure of the pro-
duction sequence. What matters is not only the strength (magni-
tude) of production linkages, but also the length of the linkages, 
determined by the number of production stages.
The traditional input- output approach to analyzing produc-
tion networks is generally concerned with the interconnected-
ness or strength of linkages between industries. The “length” 
dimension of production linkages was first addressed by the 
input- output model of average propagation length developed 
by Dietzenbacher, Romero, and Bosma (2005). The average 
propagation length model represents the average number of 
production stages lining up in every branch of production net-
works, so it effectively measures an industry’s fragmentation.40 
Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007) further applied the model to 
the international context by analyzing the cross-national linkages 
of major European economies using the 1985 European multi-
country input- output table.
Fally (2011) developed a model for measuring fragmentation 
that was based on a philosophy similar to that of the average 
propagation length model. The major difference is that Fally’s 
model, as well as Antràs and others’ (2012) variation, captures the 
average number of production stages by pegging the endpoint 
of the sequence at final consumption, which enables measuring 
the distance to final demand of a product along the production 
chains. Those studies rely on national input- output tables of the 
United States and other selected countries, but De Backer and 
Miroudot (2012) later applied Fally’s (2011) model to the inter-
country input- output tables of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development covering 56 countries for 1995, 
2000, and 2005.41
One application of the “length” model in the GVC context is 
to identify countries’ (or industries’) relative position within the 
global production system. If a country’s representative produc-
tion chains toward final products are longer than those toward 
primary products, the country is considered to operate in a rela-
tively upstream position (and conversely if a country’s represen-
tative production chains toward final products are shorter than 
those toward primary products, the country operates in a rela-
tively downstream position). Because the average propagation 
length can be measured both in forward (cost-push) and back-
ward (demand-pull) directions along production lines, it is possi-
ble to identify the relative position of a country within the global 
production networks by comparing the pairs of forward- length 
and backward- length values.
Inomata (2008) and Escaith and Inomata (2013) are among 
the earliest efforts to develop the idea of measuring the rela-
tive production positions of countries. They elucidated the struc-
tural change of the regional production system in two dimen-
sions, using data for East Asia (figure 1.10). With the horizontal 
axis for backward average propagation length and the vertical 
axis for forward average propagation length, the bottom-left to 
top-right direction presents the changes in the entire length of 
the supply chains that countries participate in, and the top-left 
to bottom-right direction draws the relative line position of each 
country within the regional production networks (as determined 
by the ratio of forward and backward average propagation 
lengths). For example, China moved along the path that is far-
thest from the bottom-left to top-right diagonal, indicating that 
it stayed in the most downstream segment of the regional supply 
chains throughout the period, which reflects the country’s domi-
nant role as a final assembler of regional products.42
The line position of industries and countries within a produc-
tion system is particularly important for considering the varia-
tions in sectoral characteristics along value chains — for example, 
value-added ratios as signified by the “smiley curve” (Baldwin, 
Forslid, and Ito 2016; Ye, Meng, and Wei 2015) or the mode of 
value chain governance (Antràs and Chor 2013).
So, what’s next?
Perhaps the most pressing issue for the GVC research community 
is to accelerate the development of relevant data. Until now, a 
large share of empirical work for testing GVC governance models 
of firm theory has relied on data from official merchandise trade 
statistics.43 Some country databases (such as the Related Party 
Trade Database from the U.S. Census Bureau) contain informa-
tion on whether shipping involves transactions between related 
or nonrelated parties, which can be used to sketch out the pres-
ence of multinational firms in international trade.44
Despite the observable advantages of the data (notably 
accessibility and availability), researchers face several challenges 
to using it appropriately. Antràs (2011) set out four of them. First, 
the product-level information aggregates the sourcing decisions 
FIGURE 1.10 Relative line position of countries in the 
regional production networks of East Asia, 1985, 2005
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of multiple firms, so some approximation is imposed for testing 
the model of firm-level sourcing behavior. Second, the data do 
not provide information about the users of the products being 
shipped, so it is impossible to identify which sector of the econ-
omy has absorbed the imported product (or even whether it is 
for intermediate use or final consumption). Third, as for the ship-
ping between related parties, the data tell neither which party is 
owned by whom, nor the degree of control or ownership share 
of the parent company. The second and third points pose a 
practical problem when relating observations in intrafirm trade 
with the characteristics of importers (headquarters, in the case 
of backward integration), as modeled in Antràs (2003). Fourth, 
the data report only the information on incoming and outgo-
ing shipments from the viewpoint of a home country. But multi-
national firms often engage in global sourcing, involving ship-
ments between third countries (for example, Apple headquarters 
in the United States may source Korean Samsung’s inputs being 
shipped to Foxconn factories in China for assembly).
Firm-level microdata, which have become increasingly avail-
able in recent years, may provide the information needed to 
develop empirical tools that overcome these problems.45 The 
benefit of the datasets rests on their representativeness of var-
ious aspects of firm operations. For example, the Basic Survey 
of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (Kigyo-katsudou 
kihon chosa toukei) by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry, has annual survey data (mandatory under the Statistics 
Act of Japan) that cover multiple types of information on firms, 
such as sales, costs, employment, capital expenditures, exports, 
imports, and foreign direct investment.46
Even so, unlike those Japanese data, many firm-level micro-
data come from one-shot industrial surveys and thus are avail-
able only for particular countries in particular years. The datasets 
also differ in the dimensions of representativeness. Accordingly, 
in order to apply these datasets to a general equilibrium setup 
like the input- output system, they should be used, for example, 
to provide combined structural information for estimating the 
relevant coefficients along with appropriate constraints and a 
balancing algorithm.
Another aspect to consider is the integration of databases, 
especially of multicountry input-output tables. Currently, various 
institutions construct competing tables, each designed for a spe-
cific analytical objective, so their presentation format, sectoral 
classification, and types of ancillary information (such as environ-
mental accounts) differ.47
A team at the University of Sydney recently launched the 
Global Multi-Region Input- Output Lab, which aims to build a 
cloud-computing platform that allows participants to use each 
other’s individually developed statistical resources. The infor-
mation from the aforementioned multicountry input- output 
databases, together with national accounts and foreign trade 
statistics, are expected to be input in the platform. Then, a 
highly detailed regional-sectoral taxonomy (the root classifica-
tion) linked to the data pool will serve as a feedstock from which 
researchers can choose any combination of regions or sectors 
to assemble the multicountry input- output tables most suited to 
their research interests. By developing a Wikipedia -like common 
e-infrastructure, the lab’s setup optimizes the use of available 
information, enhances flexibility in data construction, and saves 
resources by avoiding duplication of work among different insti-
tutions (Lenzen and others 2017).
Meta-methodological considerations
GVC studies have evolved along three distinctive modes of 
analyses: spot analysis, sequence analysis, and network analysis. 
Gary Gereffi’s earlier model, global commodity chains, consid-
ered the power relation between a lead firm and a set of multiple 
subcontractors that operate at different tiers along production 
chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). “One versus many” was 
thus the basic setup for analyzing the nature of governance. In 
contrast, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) and later 
studies moved the analytical target to one-to-one transactions 
within a particular pair of a lead firm and a supplier (Bair 2008). 
So the modal shift in GVC studies among sociologists was from 
sequence (that is, one versus many) to spot (that is, one versus 
one) analysis — or, in the Euclidean sense of the word, from one- 
dimensional to zero-dimensional spatiality.
In international trade theories the analytical focus of GVC 
studies has been primarily on a particular supply–use relation 
between trading partners, especially for a firm’s “make-or-buy” 
choice of intermediate inputs. The dominant mode of analysis has 
thus been spot analysis, yet Antràs and Chor (2013) have opened 
a new path toward sequence analysis by considering a techno-
logical ordering of production stages (from zero- dimensional to 
one-dimensional spatiality).
Input- output economics has by its nature always been con-
cerned with a sequence, whether in the traditional Leontief 
impact models or in the latest supply chain length models. How-
ever, recent work engages network theory by applying the con-
cept of network centralities to input- output matrices (Carvalho 
2012; Escaith 2014) and thereby shows some movement from 
sequence to network analysis (from one-dimensional to two- 
dimensional spatiality).
These observations suggest that the analytical frameworks of 
GVC studies are diverging rather than converging over time — 
and that the prospect for overall consolidation of methodologies 
is limited in the near future. However, this is not necessarily bad 
news. The diversity and multiplicity of methodological frame-
works imply that a wider scope of analysis is available. It is only 
a matter of how best to combine the relevant frameworks in an 
appropriate way for each research question, just as with inte-
grating various tasks into an optimal configuration of production 
chains. Keeping and facilitating interdisciplinary dialogues are 
essential, and the Global Value Chain Development Report will 
serve as a core platform for this end.
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ANNEX 1.1
Typology of global value chains
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) set out a typology of 
five global value chains (GVCs) on the basis of the structure of 
power relations between the contracting parties.
Market-type global value chain
Producing a commodity of a generic nature does not require any 
specific investment in production facilities for a particular trans-
action, so both customers and suppliers have countless choices 
for alternative partners. They are connected mainly through open 
spot-market transactions in a shoulder-to-shoulder relationship. 
Also, the procurement of a generic commodity will not neces-
sitate an exchange of detailed product specification between 
contractors because the key information is mostly reduced to 
the preset price of the product that can be found in a book of 
catalogs. The transaction cost for changing business partners is 
almost negligible, leaving the value chains in a constant state of 
flux because of their high price elasticity.
Modular-type global value chain
In business management or industrial engineering the word 
“module” generally refers to a composite of subcomponents 
grouped by the types of functions that are assumed in making 
up the final product.48 The possibility of different combinations 
of differentiated modules enables producers to design multiple 
variants of a product. By the same token, if a complex transaction 
can be accommodated in the supply base by adjusting the com-
bination of multipurpose equipment, the supplier will not have to 
incur transaction-specific investment (no hold-up problem) and 
is thus able to spread the equipment’s use across a wide range 
of potential clients. Even though the information to be delivered 
between the contractors may be considerable (say, for produc-
ing a complex product), the relative codifiability of transactions, 
as presumed in this type of GVC governance, compresses the 
volume of interventions, and the supplier is able to take overall 
control of its own production process. This implies that the trans-
action cost for changing business partners remains relatively low.
Relational-type global value chain
When the manufacturing process involves specialized equip-
ment (for example, the mold for a product of a particular shape), 
transactions become asset-specific, and the contracting par-
ties become mutually dependent. The equipment for a specific 
purpose has limited scope for alternative uses, so its productiv-
ity will drop considerably when it is applied in other contexts. 
Accordingly, the service suppliers (the holders of the specialized 
equipment) are not motivated to look for other potential clients. 
But it is also difficult, or at least costly, for the client to expect 
the same level of performance from other third suppliers with-
out these specialized facilities. As a result, both parties have little 
incentive to search for alternative business relations. Further, 
reinvestment in the specialized equipment for raising productiv-
ity deepens the asset-specificity of the transaction, thus trapping 
the parties in even more mutually dependent relationships.
Captive-type global value chain
This type of transaction assumes an overwhelming disparity in 
power exercise among the parties, as seen in the business rela-
tions between a lead firm of global brands and its subcontracting 
local small companies. Service suppliers are expected to follow 
the client’s instructions word for word and are subject to strict 
surveillance on product quality and delivery times. Unlike suppli-
ers in the market-type GVC, captive service suppliers have nei-
ther sufficient productive capacity to enjoy the scale of mass pro-
duction, nor the specialized production facilities needed to claim 
its uniqueness, as attributed to the suppliers in the relational- 
type GVC. The availability of only mediocre production capabil-
ity greatly narrows their opportunities to look for alternative busi-
ness relations, imposing a captive position toward their clients.
Hierarchy-type global value chain
As stated earlier, this type of GVC generally refers to the rela-
tions within a vertically integrated firm, as with multinational 
corporations.
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ANNEX 1.2
Governance arrangements along a production sequence
In the setup of Antràs and Chor (2013), in which a contract is 
incomplete, a lead firm (final good producer) and a supplier 
(intermediate input producer) need to bargain ex post over their 
respective share of an incremental surplus (quasi-rent) generated 
at the corresponding stage of the production sequence. Follow-
ing Grossman and Hart (1986), the lead firm acquires a better 
bargaining position and thus gains a higher share of the surplus 
when its supplier is integrated than when its supplier remains 
independent.49
Since the supplier’s investment is assumed to be relation- 
specific to the lead firm’s final product (for example, invest-
ing in the mold for a distinctive shape), the investment has no 
value outside this production sequence, which causes a familiar 
hold-up problem, such that the vertically integrated supplier 
tends to underinvest in its production capacity in anticipation of 
exploitation by the lead firm.
So the lead firm faces tradeoffs. If it integrates the supplier, 
it can extract a higher share of the surplus from that particular 
production stage, but doing so may induce underinvestment by 
the supplier, which would constrain the output or quality of the 
final product.
Here, the lead firm’s strategic space depends critically on the 
nature of the final product that it produces. Suppose that the 
product has a quite elastic market demand, so that the lead firm 
is able to generate larger revenues by producing more. Since the 
investment decision of each intermediate input supplier depends 
on the prospect of final product turnover, which further depends 
on how much the upstream suppliers prior to the current produc-
tion stage have already invested in their production capacities, 
it follows that higher investment by upstream suppliers induces 
more investment by downstream suppliers.
In contrast, if the lead firm has substantial market power and 
thus operates along an inelastic downward-sloping demand 
curve, the firm’s revenue function becomes highly concave to 
(quality-adjusted) output, and marginal revenues fall at a rela-
tively fast rate along the production sequence. As a result, the 
large upstream investment dampens the revenue prospect of 
downstream suppliers by reducing the value of undertaking 
future investment. The former investment options of suppliers 
are called sequential complements, and the latter sequential 
substitutes.50 And the type of sequentiality that characterizes 
the production process affects the lead firm’s decision about the 
organizational form of value chains.
Recall the lead firm’s tradeoffs: the rent-extraction opportu-
nities by integration, on the one hand, and the investment ineffi-
ciencies caused by such integration, on the other. On this basis, 
the lead firm should weigh the costs and benefits of integrating 
the suppliers.
For sequential complements the investment-curbing effect of 
integration is more costly in upstream production stages because 
it dampens the positive spillover of investment incentives to the 
downstream suppliers. So the lead firm should seek better bar-
gaining positions by integrating downstream segments of the 
production process, rather than upstream ones. For sequential 
substitutes, the potential underinvestment by the upstream sup-
pliers can be compensated for by the downstream suppliers. 
The lead firm is then able to place a relatively high weight on the 
rent-extraction motive in the upstream stages without worrying 
too much about the overall underinvestment.
The corollary of the argument is summarized in figure 1.6 by 
a couple of the lead firm’s decisions about the organization of 
value chains.
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Notes
1. Global Value-Chain Training and Research Workshop, June 30–July 
11, 2014, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 
China.
2. A particular concern is the difficulty of delineating a boundary 
between GVC studies and international trade literature. Apparently, 
these two areas overlap in many respects, and the relevant work is fre-
quently cross-referenced. However, the characterization of GVC stud-
ies stated here aims to limit the number of references relating to the 
vast range of important literature in international economics.
3. Throughout this chapter the following terms are considered to carry 
more or less the same meaning: international (cross-border) produc-
tion sharing, international (cross-border) fragmentation of production, 
the second unbundling, trade in tasks, and vertical specialization, 
each referring to the process and consequence of offshoring activities.
4. This theoretical breakthrough paved several development pathways 
in the days that followed. Aided by the analytical model of oligopoly 
formalized in the theory of industrial organization, it factored in the 
strategic aspects of trade policies using the language of game theory. 
Also, the element of increasing returns was further embodied and 
advanced in other subfields of economics, such as the endogenous 
growth model and the new economic geography (spatial economics).
5. As a result, industry became an inappropriate analytical unit for the 
study of international trade. See the later discussion on firm heteroge-
neity for the empirical challenges to tackle this problem.
6. A more extensive discussion of these topics can be found in many 
other GVC-related materials. See especially the comprehensive 
review in OECD (2013).
7. See Baldwin (2006) for the comprehensive argument of his view intro-
duced in this section.
8. Smith (1776, p. 15): “One man draws out the wire, another straights 
it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiv-
ing, the head; … and the important business of making a pin is, in 
this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in 
some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands….”
9. Ronald Coase is said to have opened the horizon for theorizing 
about the mechanism of vertical integration. Until then, a firm was 
conceptualized as a production set that defines and implements 
the most efficient arrangement for transforming inputs into outputs 
through multiple interactions with markets. That is, markets and firms 
were considered to be complementary in their respective functions. 
Coase’s insight about the nature of the firm has altered this view. Mar-
kets and firms are more like substitutes, in the sense that they are 
just different types of coordination arrangements for resource alloca-
tion; one through the price mechanism and the other through entre-
preneurship. So, for the issue of vertical integration, “What has to 
be explained is why one integrating force (the entrepreneur) should 
be substituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism)” 
(Coase 1937, p. 398).
10. Milberg and Winkler (2013) point out that transaction cost economics 
essentially operates within the static framework of constrained optimi-
zation such that firms would choose the most efficient form of value 
chain governance (make-or-buy) in the face of a given set of transac-
tional and bureaucratic cost structures. The resource-based approach, 
in contrast, focuses on the dynamic interplay among parties, where 
lead firms actively engage in strategic maneuvers for turning the cost 
structures to their own favor, such as spurring competition among 
suppliers or promoting supply-base capabilities. It is also important to 
consider the role of government in affecting the choice of value chain 
arrangement where markets may fail. The provision of public goods 
such as transport infrastructure gives a straightforward example. The 
underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem presents another 
case of market failure due to information asymmetry which calls for 
government intervention to, say, tighten up contract enforcement 
schemes. These issues are discussed in chapter 1 of Blyde (2014), with 
respect to Latin American and Caribbean economies.
11. For example, even in the case of a dispute, the arbitrator cannot 
judge whether the delivered good may accord with the product 
specification or whether the supplier has put sufficient effort into its 
productive activities. Contracts cannot be written on sales revenues, 
either.
12. Firms may carry out foreign direct investment for market- seeking pur-
poses (horizontal foreign direct investment) rather than for exploit-
ing factor cost differences (vertical foreign direct investment). In the 
former case, foreign direct investment may not be associated with 
vertical integration.
13. For example, the Toyota Production System, well known for its just-
in-time delivery, can be considered as an ultimate form of value chain 
management, where information sharing and task coordination across 
different divisions are implemented and achieved at the highest level 
of synchronization.
14. There are other terminologies of a similar kind in the field. Global 
supply chain is a generic label for a physical input- output sequence of 
value-adding activities across borders, used mainly in business stud-
ies that focus on logistics management or trade facilitation (how to 
reduce costs and lead times for delivery). Global commodity chain, as 
developed in Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994, p. 2), addresses wealth 
distribution by showing “how production, distribution, and consump-
tion are shaped by social relations (including organizations)….” In 
this sense, global commodity chains can be considered a predeces-
sor to the GVC concept in spirit, though their analytical frameworks 
are somewhat different (producer-driven and buyer-driven chains of 
global commodity chains, compared with the five types of GVC gov-
ernance in figure 1.4).
15. See Gereffi and Kaplinsky (2001).
16. Sectoral examples include bicycles (from hierarchy to market), apparel 
(from captive to relational), fresh vegetables (from market to rela-
tional), and electronics (from hierarchy to modular).
17. The governance structure of value chains is particularly important for 
generating and diffusing the knowledge-based capital that leads to 
innovation and industrial upgrading. See the case studies in Kawakami 
and Sturgeon (2011) for East Asian economies and Blyde (2014) for 
Latin American and Caribbean economies about the industries that 
are learning and upgrading through participation in GVCs.
18. Deardorff (2001, p. 122) defines fragmentation as “the splitting of a 
production process into two or more steps that can be undertaken in 
different locations but that lead to the same final product.”
19. The original setup in the study postulates that the firm invests in a new 
production facility for the fragmented tasks rather than outsourcing 
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them, so there is an extra span in the upward shift of the cost curve in 
the diagram.
20. The Economist 2004.
21. In the United States the issue has evolved in a wider context: whether 
jobs are destroyed by foreign competition or by technological prog-
ress. U.S. workers are competing with cheap labor abroad and with 
robots at home, and which of those is a worse enemy has been a 
topic of heated debate. See, for example, Spence (2011) for a dis-
cussion of the impact of globalization on U.S. job markets along the 
dimensions of tradeable versus nontradeable sectors and high-skilled 
versus low- and medium-skilled labor.
22. However, the declining relative wage does not necessarily make 
unskilled workers worse off because, from a general equilibrium per-
spective, the increased supply of goods to the market brought about 
by finer division of labor may lower the goods prices of both countries 
through trade, perhaps offsetting the nominal wage reduction.
23. See, for example, Blinder (2009). In the base model of Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) only low-skilled labor is assumed to be feasi-
ble for offshoring.
24. The implication of offshoring between similar countries is discussed in 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008b).
25. See endnote 9. Legros and Newman (2014) give an overview for the 
recent arguments on firm boundaries.
26. For the empirical specification the study refers to the latest develop-
ment in quantifying an industry’s upstreamness and downstreamness 
by employing the input- output model of Antràs and others (2012). 
Also, Alfaro and others (2015) develops the benchmark model of 
Antràs and Chor (2013) with three extensions. First, it considers asym-
metric differences in input contractibility; second, it incorporates the 
productivity heterogeneity of final good producers (as in Antràs and 
Helpman 2004); and third, it accommodates the case in which integra-
tion is not feasible for certain segments of the production processes 
because of external factors.
27. If nonacademic literature is included, Tempest’s (1996) account of the 
Barbie Doll is one of the earliest.
28. The product-level approaches introduced here should be strictly dis-
tinguished (in terms of the scope of analyses) from the strand of stud-
ies using industrywide microdata of firms, such as those available from 
industrial censuses.
29. The efforts to alleviate these potential drawbacks are introduced 
below in the section on firm heterogeneity.
30. The same exercise is carried out in De La Cruz and others (2011) for 
Mexico, where processing trade is also prevalent.
31. Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2015) implement a similar exercise but 
with a different motivation. They conduct a longitudinal analysis of 
the tension between a force toward regionalization and one toward 
globalization in the organization of international production net-
works. They conclude that increasing globalization (less segmentation 
into regional blocs) has been a dominant trend during the period of 
analysis.
32. To be precise, the Institute of Developing Economies was the first 
to develop and publish such measurements in the 1980s for seven 
Asian countries and the United States using the reference year of 
1975. However, the measurements were called the impact of final 
demand on value added rather than trade in value added. The major 
database for trade in terms of value added today is the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development– World Trade Organi-
zation Trade in Value-Added database. The latest release (reference 
year 2015) covers 34 industries for 64 countries (including rest of the 
world). For a general description of the data, see www.oecd.org/sti 
/ind/tiva/tivasourcesandmethods.htm. For a quick guide to the con-
cept of the trade in value added, see  Inomata (2014) or WTO and 
IDE–JETRO (2011).
33. The increasing gap between the values of two indicators is accounted 
for mainly by the shift of the base from consumer price index to gross 
domestic product deflators, rather than the change in weights from 
gross to value added terms.
34. One of the key properties of the accounting framework for trade in 
value added is the mathematical identity between a country’s total 
trade balance measured in gross terms and that in value added terms. 
Kuboniwa (2014a, 2014b) provide rigorous proofs of the relevant 
propositions.
35. Similar efforts have been made by Ahmad and others (2013) for Turkey, 
by Fetzer and Strassner (2015) for the United States, and by Piacentini 
and Fortanier (2015) for member countries of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development. Liu and others (2016) extend 
the method to the application in environmental analyses. If carbon 
emissions from production activities are regarded as negative value 
added, the carbon footprint analysis using multicountry input- output 
tables can also be considered one form of GVC studies (especially the 
topic on the political interplay among countries over production- based 
accounts and consumption- based accounts of carbon emissions).
36. Other efforts with a similar motivation include Cherubini and Los 
(2013) for Italy, Dietzenbacher, Guilhoto, and Imori (2013) for Brazil, 
and Meng, Wang, and Koopman (2013) for China. These studies 
embed the respective country’s interregional input- output table in 
the European Commission– funded World Input- Output Database.
37. See further discussion in Meng, Wang, and Koopman (2013).
38. Offshoring activities alone cannot explain whether globalization will 
create or destroy domestic jobs because the structural changes in 
labor markets are also triggered by technological innovations and 
switches in consumer demand.
39. See the model of Jones and Kierzkowski (1990).
40. However, Dietzenbacher, Romero, and Bosma (2005) do not explicitly 
use the word “fragmentation.”
41. Recent studies aim to decompose the length model into domestic 
and international segments, which enables one to depict the “gen-
uine” international fragmentation of the production process. These 
efforts include Hagiwara (2016) on the average propagation length 
model and Wang and others (2016) on the Antràs and others (2012) 
model.
42. The more formal documentation of the idea is in Miller and Temur-
shoev (2015) and Wang and others (2016), although their models 
have different specifications and are more rigorously articulated than 
those in Inomata (2008) and Escaith and Inomata (2013).
43. See, for example, Antràs (2003) and Bernard and others (2010).
44. In the U.S. data, partners are related if either party owns at least 10% 
of the other party.
45. Tomiura (2007) is one of the earliest studies using firm-level micro-
data. It applies the data to an investigation of the relation between 
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firm productivity and globalization decisions and derives results that 
are consistent with the predictions of Antràs and Helpman (2004) 
about the productivity ranking of different globalization modes.
46. The data cover only medium and large firms with 50 or more employ-
ees and whose paid-up capital is more than 30 million yen. However, 
given that global sourcing matters for large enterprises, the threshold 
is unlikely to limit the analyses.
47. The European Commission– funded World Input- Output Database 
and EXIOBASE, the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and 
Development’s Inter-Country Input- Output Tables, Purdue University’s 
Global Trade Analysis Project Multi- Regional Input- Output Database, 
and the University of Sydney’s Eora Database, among others. Diet-
zenbacher and Tukker (2013) introduce the major multicountry input- 
output table projects, and Inomata and Owen (2014) discuss the ana-
lytical implication of using different databases.
48. For example, a modular car may consist of a power- management 
module (a composite of compressors and charge controls), a drive-as-
sisting module (a composite of sensors, cameras, light emitting 
diodes), and so on.
49. Grossman and Hart (1986) define integration as the purchase by one 
firm of the residual rights of control over another firm’s assets. While 
transaction cost economics is concerned with inefficiencies arising 
from both the ex post haggling by the parties over quasi-rents and 
the consequent ex ante underinvestment (and its negative impact on 
ex post performance), the property-rights literature focuses on the 
impact of property-rights assignment (the choice of organizational 
form) on ex post bargaining, which is assumed to be efficiently con-
ducted, and that, in turn, affects the party’s decision about ex ante 
investment.
50. More specifically, sequential complementarity and substitutability are 
determined by the relative magnitudes of (1) the market demand elas-
ticity for the final product and (2) the elasticity of substitution among 
intermediate inputs. If (1) is larger than (2), the investment options are 
sequential complements; otherwise, they are sequential substitutes. 
In the usual sense of the word the suppliers’ investments are always 
complementary. Only when the standard complementarity of interme-
diate inputs is dominated by the effect of a quick erosion of revenue 
prospect due to the low demand elasticity of the final product does 
the relation turn from complements to substitutes.
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